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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to the proceedings are Plaintiff/Appellee Viking
Insurance Company and Defendants/Appellants Trans Coastal
Trucking and Allen Coleman.

Defendants Rene Peterson and UDOT

did not file an appeal and do not participate in these
proceedings.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is appropriate
under U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly ruled that the accident
caused by Mr. Coleman's negligent crossing of a roadway did not
arise out the use or maintenance of his insured vehicle as
defined by the Viking automobile insurance policy.
The standard of review of a trial court's order granting
summary judgment interpreting an insurance policy is for
correctness.

AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Moran & Co., 860 P.2d 924

(Utah 1993) .
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-303 is at issue in this case
because its language regarding mandatory coverage for automobile
liability policies is coextensive with the language of the Viking
Insurance Company policy language at issue here.
The statute in relevant part states:
(1)

In addition to complying with the requirements of
1

Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) shall:
(b)(i)if it is an owner's policy, designate by
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which
coverage is granted, insure the person named in the
policy, insure any other person using any named motor
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection
(l)(c) against loss from the liability imposed by law
for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use of these motor vehicles within the United States
and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and
costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than
the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304 .
UCA § 31A-22-303(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's order
granting summary judgment to Plaintiff/Appellee Viking Insurance
Company, ruling that as a matter of law Defendant/Appellant Allen
Coleman's liability for the accident in question did not arise
out of the use or maintenance of his Viking insured vehicle.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an automobile - pedestrian accident which
occurred on State Road 201 (2100 South freeway) at approximately
5600 West in Salt Lake County, Utah on January 7, 1994. Mr.
Coleman was attempting to cross the roadway to return to his
vehicle when he tripped on the uneven surface of the roadway and
fell.

An oncoming semi-tractor trailer, owned by Trans Coastal

Trucking and driven by Rene Peterson, attempted to avoid hitting
Mr. Coleman, swerved and rolled into the median causing injuries
2

to the driver and property damage.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Viking Insurance Company filed an action in declaratory
relief pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-3-1 against Defendants Coleman,
Peterson, Trans Coastal Trucking and UDOT. See R. 1. Viking
requested the trial court declare that the accident did not arise
out of the use or maintenance of Coleman's automobile which was
insured by Viking at the time. See R. 4.
After discovery, Viking filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that the material facts giving rise to the accident
were not in dispute making the interpretation of the Viking
insurance contract an appropriate question of law. See R. 82.
Trans Coastal filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary
judgment. See R. 162. Coleman joined in Trans Coastal's motion
on May 24, 1995 and Peterson joined in Trans Coastal motion on
May 26, 1995. See R. 195, 198.
Oral argument was held on August 1, 1995. At the hearing
Judge Homer Wilkinson granted Viking's motion for summary
judgment and denied the Defendants' motion. See R. 228. The
trial court entered its order granting Viking's motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Defendants' counterclaims against
Viking. See Appendix A, R. 238. This appeal follows by Coleman
and Trans Coastal.

Peterson and UDOT did not join in the appeal.

3

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT FOR REVIEW
The following facts were not disputed in the court below:
1.

Defendant, Allen K. Coleman, was a named insured under

an automobile liability policy number 44 0005256, issued by
Viking Insurance Company.
2.

See Appendix "A," R. 97.

The policy was issued for a 1983 Oldsmobile Omega, VIN

1G3AE69R7DW351369 owned by Mr. Coleman.
3.

See Id.

The policy provides for coverage as follows:
We promise to pay damages, within the limits of
our policy, for bodily injury or property damage for
which the law holds you responsible because of a car
accident
involving a car we insure.

See, Appendix "A" (emphasis in original).
4.

A car accident

is defined in the policy as, "an

unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or
property damage and arises out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of a car or other motor vehicle."

Appendix "A", at 2

(emphasis added); cf. U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(1).
5.

On January 7, 1994, Defendant Coleman had been having

mechanical trouble with his 1983 Oldsmobile Omega automobile. See
R. 123, Deposition of Allen Coleman, p. 8.
6.

Mr. Coleman had experienced a carburetor fire earlier

that day while on his way to work.
1.

See Id.

Mr. Coleman attempted to drive the car from the point

of the carburetor fire to his home in Magna, Utah in order to
repair the vehicle. See R. 121. Mr. Coleman testified, "I got it
4

[the car] running to where I could get it back out to where my
parents live, out in Magna where I was staying, and the car
stopped again, just completely stopped at this point."
8.

See Id.

Mr. Coleman pulled his disabled vehicle off the right

side of the road on westbound State Road 201 near its
intersection with 5600 West in Salt Lake City. See Id.
9.

Mr. Coleman diagnosed the problem as a defective

thermostat and believed he could make the repairs himself without
towing the vehicle from its place off the side of the road. Id.
10.

Mr. Coleman left his vehicle and traveled immediately

south, crossing the westbound, two-lane roadway (his prior
direction of travel).

He then crossed the median, and then

crossed the two eastbound lanes of the 2100 South freeway.

See

R. 123.
11.

Mr. Coleman climbed the fence which boarders the

roadway and went to a nearby service station and telephoned an
auto parts store, ordering a replacement part.
12.

Mr. Coleman then returned to his car by the same route

to wait for delivery of the part.

After approximately ninety

minutes, the part had not been delivered.
13.

See R. 122.

See R. 121.

Mr. Coleman again left his vehicle, crossed the two

lanes of westbound traffic, the median, the two lanes of
eastbound traffic, climbed the fence and returned to the
telephone to inquire regarding delivery of the part.
informed that the part would be delivered immediately.
5

He was
See R.

121-122.
14.

Mr. Coleman then began to repeat the same route to

return to his vehicle to wait for the delivery. Id.
15.

After climbing the fence, Mr. Coleman began traveling

north, across the eastbound lanes of the 2100 South freeway when
he tripped on the uneven surface of the roadway, landing on and
injuring his ri - *t knee.
16.

See R. 125-126.

Mr. Cuieman has a fused left knee and, as a result of

injuring his right knee in the fall, he was unable to get up or
otherwise move off of the roadway. See Exhibit R. 125.
17.

Defendant, Rene Peterson was driving a semi tractor-

trailer owned by Defendant Trans Coastal Trucking eastbound on
State Road 201 at the time Coleman fell. See R. 128.
18.

When Mr. Peterson saw Mr. Coleman lying in the road,

Mr. Peterson attempted to avoid colliding with Mr. Coleman and
overturned the truck in the median causing injury and property
damage.
19.

See R. 1-6, 45-53, 222-227.
Mr. Coleman admitted in deposition that nothing about

the car or anything related to the car caused him to fall.

See

R. 134. He also admits that his fall was caused by a combination
of the uneven pavement and his fused knee which limited his
mobility after the fall.

See R. 137-38.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Coleman's
negligence (and resulting liability) did not arise out of the use
6

or maintenance of the Viking insured vehicle. While insurance
contracts are construed liberally, they are limited by the
intended purposes the specific type of insurance. Moreover,
statutory coverage requirements in Utah are identical to the
Viking policy language.

Therefore, interpretation of the policy

language also interprets the statute.

Rules of statutory

construction mandate that terms be given effect according to
their plain meaning.
The accident did not arise
vehicle.

out of use or maintenance of the

Courts of every jurisdiction require a significant

causal connection between an accident and an insured vehicle
before liability coverage will be implicated.

But for causation

is insufficient to implicate insurance coverage because nothing
relating to the vehicle is causally related to the accident.
The accident in this case did not arise out of the use of
the vehicle because Mr. Coleman was not using the vehicle as a
vehicle, or for any purpose inherent in its nature as a vehicle,
at the time.

Mr. Coleman was removed from the insured vehicle in

time, space, activity, focus and purpose when he fell.
Similarly, Mr. Coleman was not maintaining
time he fell.

the vehicle at the

He was not engaged in any activity causally

connected with the act of maintaining a vehicle when he fell.
The trial court properly ruled that the accident in question
did not arise out of the use or maintenance of the insured
vehicle.

Summary judgment may be affirmed in favor of Viking.
7

ARGUMENT
I.
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN UTAH ARE TO BE INTERPRETED LIBERALLY
TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF INSURANCE.
The Viking automobile policy specifically provides for
payment for damages arising out of "a car accident
car we insure."

involving a

See Exhibit "1". A "car accident" is defined in

the policy as, "an unexpected and unintended event that causes
bodily injury or property damage and arises out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a car or other motor vehicle."

Appendix

"A", at p.2 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Annotated § 31A22-303(1) .
According to the Supreme Court, "[g]enerally the
interpretation of insurance policy language presents a question
of law to be decided by the trial judge using accepted methods of
construction."
1992).

Nielson v. O'Reilly. 84 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah

Insurance policies are to be liberally interpreted to

"promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance". U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993).
Liberal interpretation of insurance contracts is, however,
tempered by the reasonable limitations imposed by the "commonly
understood meaning" of a policy's terms. Cf.. P.E. Ashton Co. v.
Jovner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965).
The policy at issue in this case is an automobile liability
policy.

The "purpose" of such insurance is statutorily
8

established,

Utah law e x p r e s s l y requires an insurer t o provide

l i a b i l i t y insurance for damages "arising out of" the "ownership,
maintenance or use of a v e h i c l e " i n a l l automobile l i a b i l i t y
p o l i c i e s i s s u e d i n the s t a t e .

See U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(1).

The s t a t u t o r y language i n Utah i s s u b s t a n t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l t o
the language of the Viking p o l i c y .

Therefore, t h i s Court's

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s of the Viking p o l i c y
w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h t h i s S t a t e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of U.C.A. § 31A22-303(1).

In d e f i n i n g the relevant terms at i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e ,

p r i n c i p l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n apply. 1

By i t s express

s t a t u t o r y purpose, automobile l i a b i l i t y insurance i s not intended
t o provide general l i a b i l i t y coverage for a person's n e g l i g e n c e .
Id.
Utah courts have not decided any c a s e s d e f i n i n g or
addressing whether the conduct of a driver "arises out of" the
"ownership, maintenance or use" of a v e h i c l e under e i t h e r the
s t a t u t e or s p e c i f i c insurance p o l i c y language.
Court's

Therefore,

this

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the "plain language" of U.C.A. § 31A-

The Supreme Court has i n s t r u c t e d , H the primary rule of s t a t u t o r y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t o give e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e in l i g h t of the
purpose the s t a t u t e was meant t o achieve." Sullivan v . Scoular Grain Co,, 853
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). The Court continued, - t o discover that i n t e n t , we
look f i r s t t o the p l a i n language of the s t a t u t e . " Harmon City v. Nielsen &
Senior,
Adv. Rep.
(Utah 1995) ( c i t i n g State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,
1357 (Utah 1 9 9 3 ) ) . In defining statutory terms the Court s t a t e d , "we assume that
'each term in the statue i s used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
l i t e r a l l y unless such a reading i s unreasonably confused or inoperable." Johnson
v. Redevelopment Agency of S a l t Lake County, 277 Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995) ( c i t i n g
Savage I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah
1991)) .
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22-303(i) will a fortiori define the "liberal reading" of the
Viking policy.
II.
THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF COLEMAN'S USE
OF THE VIKING INSURED VEHICLE.
The issue in this case is whether Mr. Coleman's actions
arose out of the use or maintenance of the Viking insured
vehicle.

The District Court properly ruled the accident did not

arise out of the use of the insured vehicle based on the
undisputed facts. See Nielsen, at 665.
The following arguments will affirm that the trial court
correctly ruled that the accident in this case did not "arise out
of" the "use" or "maintenance" of the Viking insured vehicle as a
matter of law.
A.

The decision of the trial court may be affirmed.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DO NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE
ACCIDENT "ARISE OUT OF" USE OR MAINTENANCE OF THE VEHICLE.
The initial question to be resolved is whether the accident

in question is one which arises
vehicle.

out of the use of the insured

This issue is essentially a determination of the

causation necessary to implicate insurance coverage under Utah
law and the language of the policy.
While Utah courts have not defined the terms "arising out
of" in the context of an automobile policy, the term has been
touched upon in the context of a homeowner's liability policy in
National Farmers Union Property & Cas* Co. v. Western Casualty &
Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978).
10

The Supreme Court in

National Farmers Union recognized that the term arising

out of i n

the automobile insurance context "imports a concept of c a u s a t i o n ;
there must be a causal nexus between an accident or injury i n the
ownership, maintenance or use of the v e h i c l e . "

National Farmers

Union, at 963 (quoting Vanguard I n s . v . C a n t r e l l , 503 P.2d 962
(Ariz. App. 1973))

(emphasis added).

S i m i l a r l y , the Florida Court of Appeals i n Government
Employees I n s . Co. v . Batchelder 421 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. App. Dl
1982) 2 s p e c i f i e d t h a t the causation element requires something
l e s s than proximate cause but s u f f i c i e n t causation t o c o n s t i t u t e
a "nexus" or "connection" t o the v e h i c l e .

In Colorado 3 the

Supreme Court explained the necessary causal r e l a t i o n s h i p
s t a t i n g , "the causation t e s t does not require that the insured
v e h i c l e i t s e l f be the cause of the i n j u r y , only t h a t the use be
i n t e g r a l l y r e l a t e d t o the c l a i m a n t ' s a c t i v i t i e s and the injury at
the time of the a c c i d e n t . " Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v .
McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 103 (Colo. 1995).
The Colorado Supreme Court noted, "[t]he reason for t h i s
causal requirement i s t o ensure that there i s some nexus between
2

For an injury t o f a l l within the "use" coverage of an automobile p o l i c y
i n Florida H ( l ) the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the
automobile, as such; (2) the accident must have arisen within the natural
t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s of an automobile, and the actual use must not have terminated?
(3) the automobile must not merely contribute t o cause the condition which
produces the injury, but must i t s e l f produce the injury."
Batchelder, at 6 1 .
3

The language of the Colorado s t a t u t e i s nearly i d e n t i c a l t o that in
Utah requiring p o l i c i e s t o "insure every [insured] person on account of the
maintenance, use or operation of the motor v e h i c l e " . Section 42-7-413 C.R.S.

11

the vehicle's use and the injury.

The nexus guarantees that the

accident is within the kind of risks that the automobile
insurance was meant to cover." McMichael, at 103.

The court

further stated that the causation requirement helps distinguish
"between 'injuries that are related to the use of an automobile,
and injuries that are related to an automobile only because they
coincidentally occurred in the vehicle.'" McMichael, (quoting
Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1986)).
In Kolkin v. American Family Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 538, 540
(Minn.App. 1984) the Minnesota test for causation is set forth in
a four part test:
1) there must be some "causal connection" between the
injury and the use of the vehicle for transportation
purposes, Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d
116 (Minn. 1981);
2) this "causal connection" is less than proximate
cause but more than the vehicle being the "mere situs"
of the injury; Id.;
3) the requisite connection exists of the injury is a
"natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the
use of the vehicle," Id.; and
4) the vehicle must be an "active accessory" to the
injury sustained. Holm v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins.
Co., 261 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1977).
Idaho courts specify that the "arising out of" language of a
policy requires more than "but for" causation.

Hawkeye-Security

Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 866 P.2d 976, 982 (Idaho App. 1994).
The court explained there must be some "substantial nexus between
the use of the vehicle and the injury."

Hawkeye-Security, at 980

(citing 6B Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4316 (1979)).

In

their opening brief, Appellants suggest that the Supreme Court's
12

interpretation of arising

out of in the National Farmers Union,

case encompasses any event which can be connected to an accident
by a potentially endless chain of fortuitous

but-for

relationships. See Appellant's brief pp. 9-10.
Other courts have expressly and implicitly rejected the
gossamer thread of but for causation Appellants suggest.

In

Hawkeye-Security the court flatly stated it "is not enough to say
that 'but for' the use of the automobile, the injury would not
have occurred."

Hawkeye-Security. at 980. The court then cited

numerous cases which eschew the but for analysis and require a
more substantial causal

connection between the use of the

automobile and the injury or accident.

See Hawkeye-Security, at

980-981(and authority cited therein).

The court stated, "a

contrary view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would
'attach automobile insurance to every accident which occurred
after an insured had first been transported by an automobile.'"
Hawkeye, at 982 (citing Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Safeco
Insurance Co., 163 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (Cal. App. 1983)).
The court in Hawkeye-Security cited its prior opinion in
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 691 P.2d 1289 (Idaho
App. 1984), stating:
The policy provisions requiring the injury to "arise
out of the use" of the vehicle connotes a causal relation
between the injury and the use. The causal connection must
be more than incidental or fortuitous.
Smith, 691 P.2d at 1290 (emphasis added).
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This Utah Supreme Court's dicta in National Farmers Union,
recognizing a "causal nexus" must exist is consistent with the
causation requirements expressed in other jurisdictions and as
explained in Hawkeye-Security.

Appellants' claim that

arising

out of language can be fairly read to encompass but for causation
is also erroneous on other levels as well.
Initially, Appellants' espousal of but for causation is
inconsistent with a significant line of cases which find
causation lacking where the vehicle is the "mere situs" of the
accident.

Other jurisdictions generally recognize the mere fact

that an automobile is the place where an injury occurs does not,
itself, implicate automobile liability insurance coverage.

See

Criterion v. Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986); see also Allied
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrick, 819 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Kan. 1991)
(intentional sexual assault in an insured vehicle does not arise
out of use of vehicle to trigger liability coverage); State Farm
Auto Ins. Co v. Nol, 699 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tenn. 1993) (two police
officers shot in their patrol vehicle by stranded driver who was
given a ride was not an accident arising out of the use of the
vehicle).

Assuming only but for causation is required, each of

these cited cases would have triggered coverage because a but for
connection can be made to the insured vehicle.
On the issue of mere incidental relation to the vehicle, the
court in Stuckv v. Long. 783 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1989) held:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
14

(using Minnesota law) the accident must be a natural and
reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the motor
vehicle* The fact that the automobile was used preceding the
accident does not establish a sufficient causal connection.
Stucky, at 503 (citing Gilbertson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 845 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added).
The inapplicability of tenuous, but for causation is further
demonstrated by the fact that many cases hold that physical
proximity to the vehicle alone is not enough to trigger coverage.
Chamblee v. State Farm, 601 S.2d 922, 923 (Ala. 1992) (coverage
not implicated where child exited vehicle, crossed street to
median and then was struck by car while crossing street); Pope v.
Stolts, 712 S.W. 2d 434, 436 (Mo. 1986) (injury to plaintiff
while leaning over open hood of first vehicle while second
vehicle was immediately adjacent and assisting to jump start
first vehicle was not accident arising out of the use of the
second vehicle);

Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Logan, 451

N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (N.Y. 1982) (slip and fall in icy parking lot
while returning to insured car did not arise out of use of
vehicle and did not arise from the intrinsic nature of the
vehicle).
Appellants' claim of but for causation is further defeated
by cases which recognize that the causation may be broken by acts
of independent significance.

The court in Stucky recognized,

"[tjhe causal connection can be severed by any intervening act of
independent significance." Stucky, at 503 (citing Gilbertson v.
15

State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins, Co., 845 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1988)).
In Stucky an uninsured driver attempted to assault the insured
while he and the insured were each driving their own vehicles.
The two vehicles later stopped and the drivers exited their
respective cars.

The insured was then assaulted by the driver of

the uninsured vehicle.

The insured made a claim on his own

uninsured motorist policy asserting his injuries arose out of the
assailant's use of an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by his
own automobile insurance policy.
The court ruled that uninsured motorist coverage did not
apply because the assault was not causally connected to the
uninsured vehicle.

The court also rejected the insured's

argument that but for the prior use of the uninsured vehicle he
would not have been in the place he was attacked.
such causation was too remote.

The court said

The court concluded:

Although it can be argued that (the insured) would not have
been in the that place at that time if (the uninsured
driver) had not tried to run him off the roadf the injuries
(the insured) received did not arise out of the use of (the
uninsured driver's) automobile. There was no causal
connection between the uninsured motor vehicle and (the
insured's injuries). As in Race v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
supra, the injuries occurred only after the parties had left
their automobiles. The causal connection required for
uninsured motorist coverage may not be a remote cause."
Stucky, at 505.
Consistently, in Hawkeye-Security, the court citing Holm v.
Mutual Service Casualty Co., 261 N.W. 2d 598, 603 (Minn. 1977)
concluded that in numerous cases, "the acts of leaving a vehicle
16
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found

vehicle stalled in floodwatersf broke the causal nexus between
the vehicle's use and the passenger's subsequent, accidental
drowning.
In Dohman v. Housely, 478 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. App. 1991) the
court ruled that injuries incurred by a police officer who was
struck by a vehicle after leaving his police car to approach a
third vehicle for purposes of investigation did not arise out of
the "use" of the patrol car*

The court ruled that the patrol car

was not the active accessory nor in anyway causally related to
his injury.
Similarly, a policeman who was injured when he was chasing a
suspect on foot after stopping his car was not entitled to
uninsured motorist coverage.

The court ruled that the uninsured

car the suspect had been traveling in prior to the foot pursuit
was not the injury causing instrumentality of the officer's
injury. Carter v. Burns, 630 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio App. 1993).
In sum, the causation required is more than but
causation but less than legal, proximate cause.
some causal

for

There must be

relationship between the accident and the use or

maintenance of the vehicle.

That causal relationship must not be

merely fortuitous or incidental.

The relationship may not be

terminated or broken by acts of independent significance or new
undertakings.
The specific facts of the present case demonstrate that Mr.
Coleman's vehicle was not causally
18

related to the accident.

Mr.

Coleman's negligent attempt to cross a busy roadway while
returning to hi s veh i cle w a s the occurrence wh i ch set the
sequence of events in tc mo tic n causii lg the a ::c:i dei i t
Chamblee, at 92 i
was I ist
ven.

.
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Mi

Coleman's act of crossing the busy highway w a s an act of
independent significance,, break i ng the cha i n of causati on, c f .
Id •

M r . Coleman had been in a pJ ace c f safe t;j c ff c f the road •

He could 1: 1a \ e easily (and properly) returned to h Is vehicle
without I Illegally crossing the highway.

His neg] i gent act of

attempting to cross the freeway was the cause of the accident.
His subjective intent to return, to the vehicle for whatever
purpose i s I rrel evant to the zausat i on i nqu :a ry •

See Thomas »

T r a v e l e r s I n s , , 38 3 ' N, 1 S 2c 1 193

Il 9 76 )
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No causal relationship has been established between the
accident and the veh il cle based on the und I spi ited facts,
Therefore, the* trial court w a s correct :ii i:i i: m l ing that ! Ir,
coleman/s negligence did not arise out
insured vehicle as a matte i: c f 3 aw •

of

the use of the Viking

The tr ial court's ruling

that the Viking policj does not cover this event w a s proper and
may be affinne I

B.

THE ACCIDENT DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE USE OF THE INSURED
AUTOMOBILE.
The second aspect of the issue before this Court is whether

Mr. Coleman's activities at the time of the accident, if causally
connected to the vehicle, constituted use of the insured vehicle
within the plain meaning of that word.

The undisputed facts show

that at the time of the accident Mr. Coleman was walking across a
street when he tripped and fell on the uneven roadway.
The court in McMichael begun its analysis by stating, "when
determining the meaning of the term use in an automobile
insurance policy, a court must look to the factual circumstances
in each case, including the particular characteristics of the
vehicle and the intention of the parties to the insurance
contract."

McMichael, at 102. Courts generally begin the

analysis of the use of a vehicle by examining whether the vehicle
was being used as a vehicle.

In other words, the use of the

vehicle at the time of the accident must be consistent with the
vehicle's inherent nature and purpose; in this case,
transportation.

In McMichael, the court defined the issue before

it as whether the insured was "using an insured vehicle in a
manner that was not foreign to its inherent purpose at the time
of the accident." McMichael, at 101 (emphasis added).4

4
The dissent in McMichael, also agreed that the use of the vehicle
must be inherent to its nature. The dissent stated, "The burden on the claimant
to establish that he was not using the vehicle in a manner foreign to its
inherent purpose.'* McMichael at 108 (dissent) (citing Chung La v. State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1010-1011 (Colo. 1992)).
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The court I n Hawkeye-Security, began its inquiry cf this
issue by stati 1:1 ::j " 1 i abi 1 1 ty i nsurance coverage wi 1 ] ^e afforded
i n tl: le present case on] j :i f t:l: :i s • [ ] :i 1 lji :i i: } i * a „ 3 cai is a]

• -i

to (the insured's) use of the automobile and that use of the
vehicle was related m t o_ the inherent nature of the automobile,"
Hawkeye-Securit \ r , at 9 3 9 (emphasi s added)

The c 011 11: t lit n Haw keye-

Security, further stated that the injury must be shown to arise
from, the "inherent nature of the automobi ] e i n order to bri ng it
within the terms of the 'i lse ' cl a;i ise, "

Hawkeye-Secui ity

a 1: 979 .

In Florida the first prong of the four par t test requires
that

"the accident must hav e ari sen out of the i nherent ~ar-*re

of the automobile, as such," Government Employees Insurance ^u,
v. Batchelder, 421 So, 2d 59 (Fla.App

1)1! 1982) (emphasis added).

I11 McMichael , the court cone] uded 1
In the present case, McMichael's accident was integrally
related to his work on the road, where it was expected that
he would be put in danger from, other motorists. For this
reason, the truck was equipped with protective gear and
warnings devices and was positioned to provide a barrier.
Thus at the time of the accident, McMichael was using the
truck for protection, the truck was not merely the physical
location where the accident occurred.
McMichael, at ] 04

In contrast to the facts of the present

^ .=, ^,

purpose (a warning and safety barrier) while the insured was out
of the vehicle working on the road.
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In the present case, the

Viking insured vehicle did not continue to serve its inherent
purpose (transportation) once Mr. Coleman left the area.
Moreover, an ordinary motorist does not ordinarily use a vehicle
in the manner that the plaintiff in McMichael did.
The court in McMichael then went on to focus on other cases
dealing with the inherent nature of automobiles having
specialized or peculiar uses or equipment.

For example, the

court cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia which
ruled that a fire fighter injured while filling out a report 25
feet from his fire truck was using his fire truck at the time
because "use of the fire truck to extinguish the fire, control
traffic and protect fire fighters including (the plaintiff), was
an integral part of the fire fighters' mission." Great American
Insurance Co. v. Cassell, 389 S.E.2d 476, 477 (Va. 1990).
However, that same supreme court has previously ruled that a
police officer who was injured after he exited his vehicle to
serve a subpoena was not using his vehicle at the time of the
injury. Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry,134 S.E.2d 418,
421 (Va. 1964).

The court ruled that at the time of the injury

the officer was not using the vehicle as a vehicle.

Instead, the

officer had ceased using the vehicle for any specialized purpose
prior to the time of the accident. Id.
The Cassell case and similar decisions illustrate that it is
essential that the vehicle itself continues to be used as a
vehicle when the accident occurs.
22

See e.g. Monroe Guar.Ins. Co.
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The test in, Washington is: (1) there must be a causal relation or
connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle; (2) the person
asserting coverage must be in reasonably close geographic proximity to the
insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it; (3) the
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v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 892 P.2d 768, 770 (Wash. App. 1995).
In Thomas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Ny.App.
1976) held that injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was en
route to his car but who was not within or actually entering his
vehicle when struck by another vehicle did note arise out of the
use of the vehicle.

The court reasoned that at the time of the

accident the insured was acting as a pedestrian rather than
engaging in ownership, use or maintenance of his vehicle. Cf.
Cherry, supra at n.6, factor 3. The court further stated that the
insured's future intent to enter and we the vehicle was not
relevant to the analysis.

Thomas, at 499.

In Hawkeye-Security the court further distinguished that the
use of an ordinary vehicle for an unusual purpose does not
trigger coverage.

The court held that an ordinary motorist's use

of a vehicle in a manner not inherent to its ordinary purpose was
not a use of the vehicle reasonably related to the car's inherent
nature under the policy.

The driver in Hawkeye-Securitv used his

vehicle to block the road.

The court, distinguishing other

cases, found that such a use was not inherent to the nature of
regular passenger vehicles stating:
When Gilbert parked his car in a position to narrow the
area available for Laragan's passage and exited the
vehicle to confront Laragan, he abandoned his role as a
motorist and also abandoned any use of the car

person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the
time; and (4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the
use of the vehicle at the time. Cherry, at 770.
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IIII

wliiii Ii

"normal maintenance and repairs" were inherent in the use of a
vehicle.

See Eichelberqer v. Rice, 434 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1981)

(putting gas into a vehicle when injury occurred); Automobile
Association v. United States Fire Ins. Co., Ill Cal. Rptr. 595
(1974) (starting car while gas was being poured into the
carburetor when injury occurred)).

Unlike the present case,

these cited cases involve direct interaction with the vehicle
when the accidents occurred.

In this case there is no connection

between walking across a street and acts inherent in maintaining
a vehicle such as putting gas in it, opening the hood, lying
underneath it, changing a tire, etc.

Mr. Coleman admitted that

the vehicle did not cause him to fall.

See Exhibit "2", at 21.

Therefore, the injury did not involve maintenance of the vehicle.
Hawkeye-Security, also rejects the Defendants' position on
several levels.

First, the activity of walking across a street

is not remotely connected to the inherent tasks of maintaining a
vehicle contemplated by the parties in procuring or offering
automobile liability insurance.

Mr. Coleman was not in or at the

vehicle effecting repairs to the vehicle when the injury occurred
as in the Appellants' cited cases.
Mr. Coleman was also engaging in activities distant in both
time and scope from the vehicle itself.

Further, the independent

act of leaving the vehicle and arriving at a point of safety
breaks the chain of causation.

See Hawkeye-Securitv, at 980.

Third, the presence of the vehicle is merely incidental and
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As in the example-. . n "cm-

present situati on, the causa ] 1 i nk i s broken by Mr'. Co] eman

negligent act of illegally crossing a highway was the action, upon
which neqliqence is asserted against Mr. Coleman rather than any

act arising from the manner in which he maintained the vehicle.
Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that as a matter of
law, Mr. Coleman's negligent crossing of the highway is not
causally related to any use, or maintenance of an insured vehicle
under the policy.

As a result, Plaintiff is under no obligation

to provide liability coverage for Mr. Coleman's independent acts
of negligence.
III.
DEFENDANT'S CITED CASES ARE NOT ON POINT AND READILY
DISTINGUISHABLE.
Defendant cites the case of Eichelberaer v. Rice, 434 A.2d
747 (Pa. 1981), as being directly on point. The case is readily
distinguishable on its facts.6

In Eichelberaer, the accident

took place at the insured vehicle when a passenger stepped back
from the vehicle.

Id. at 750. The parties in Eichelberaer were

in the very act of maintaining the vehicle by putting gas into
the tank when the accident occurred.

Id. at 750.

In the present

case the accident took place across the highway from where the
vehicle was parked.

In the present case no one was at the car in

the very act of maintaining it. These facts alone are sufficient
to distinguish the case.
Furthermore, in Eichelberaer, the court's definition of
"maintenance" tends to defeat Mr. Coleman's position in this

6

As pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, the resolution of the
inquiry in these cases is highly fact specific, see McMichael at 102.

28

case

In Eichelberaer, the court defined "maintenance" as
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(emphasj s added)
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car plainly comes within the definition of maintenance.
the action, of crossi ng a street does not*

However,

Eichelberaer fails to

finding that Mr. Coleman was maintaining his vehicle at the time
of the accident.
1 1: le :::: ase • :: i: Na bioi lwide Mu bual 11 is . Co. i
892 (NC.Ct .App. 1995 ) :i s a lso d I stinguishable.

Da u i s , 4"" i' i ' i . Il

The Plaintiff in

Davis was injured when she a lighted from a v eh i cl e and was struck

the causal link was established because Ms. Davis parked the van
in snnh a way that the plaintiff had to cross a roadway to reach
the

li<'i

die si. J, n a l

LOLI.

Ua\

i b

"i I

HI"

The Davis case is distinguished by the cogent analysis i n
Chamblee where the court properly draws the causal ,1 i ne when, a
par L j II, i•»id\
a!

"in J11!11]

i-. I I

e 1 n,i t • I a .111 I i e a i "lies a, poi n I: of s a,f e t:,,y, C h a m b l e e

in Davis f the placement of the vehi cle i eguired the

passenger to cross the street and she was struck immediately,

fence, cross the street was for convenience, so he wouldn't have
to wa] k i t, the next exi t off tl: i,e highway

Coleman' s decision was

party in Davis who had to cross the roadway to join her
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" 11

grandmother.

Davis, at 895; C£. Chamblee at 924.

Defendants also cite Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 386
N.W.2d 299 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) as supportive.

That case is

distinguished by its facts as well as the holding of Logan, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 805. The vehicle at issue in Barry was still the
focus of the insured's activity at the time of the accident.

The

act of walking was the focus of the party's activity in Logan.
In this case the focus of Coleman's activity at the time was
walking and traversing the street rather than on the use or
maintenance of the vehicle, making Logan applicable.

Mr.

Coleman's actions were not activities related to the use of the
vehicle as a vehicle as in Barry, making Barry inapplicable.
Finally the case of Kolkin v. American Family Ins. Co., 347
N.W.2d 538 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) which Appellants cite is not
supportive of their position.

In that case the accident occurred

while an inoperable vehicle was abandoned and yet/ was still left
in the roadway.

The court stated/ "a vehicle obstructing a

roadway is not, however, spassive' in terms of legal causation/
unlike a tree or a stone or other object alongside the roadway,
particularly in the hours of darkness without proper warning
lights, makes such a vehicle an vactive accessory' to a
collision."

JEd. at 534. The vehicle in Kolkin was still located

in a place inherent to its traveling function; the roadway.
court agreed that coverage applied stating, "the 'use' of the
vehicle had not ended when it was left obstructing the road."
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Kolkin, at 540.
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he fell and caused the accident in question.
The trial court properly ruled that the accident in question
did not arise out of the use or maintenance of the insured
vehicle.

Summary judgment may be affirmed in favor of Viking.

DATED this 9

day of May, 1996.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

Attorneys for Viking Insurance
Company of Wisconsin
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Taylor D. Carr
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APPENDIX " 1 "

31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage.
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa) shall:
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose
name the policy was purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium
charged, the policy period, and the limits of liability;
(b) (i) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage
is granted, insure the person named in the policy,
insure any other person using any named motor
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection
(7), insure any person included in Subsection (lXc)
against loss from the liability imposed by law for
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use of these motor vehicles within the United
States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of
interest an4 costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts
not less than the minimum limits specified under
Section 31A-22-304; or
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person
named as insured against loss from the liability
imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of
the insured^ use of any motor vehicle not owned by
him, within the same territorial limits and with the
same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under
Subsection (lXbXi); and
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons
related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the named
insured's household, including those who usually make
their home in the same household but temporarily live
elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured.
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa) may:
(a) provide for the prorating of the insurance under
that policy with other valid and collectible insurance;
(b) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the required motor vehicle liability coverage;
(c) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor
vehicle business, limit the coverage afforded to a motor
vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those
instances when there is no other valid and collectible
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent; and
(d) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict coverage afforded to anyone other than the motor vehicle
business or its officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those
instances when there is no other valid and collectible
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent

(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any
liability:
(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title
35;
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an
employee of the named insured, other than a domestic
employee, while engaged in the employment of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance, or
repair of a designated vehicle; or
(c) resultingfromdamage to property owned by, rented
to, bailed to, or transported by the insured.
(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability
coverage has therightto settle any claim covered by the policy,
and if the settlement is made in good faith, the amount of the
settlement is deductible from the limits of liability specified
under Section 31A-22-304.
(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage
imposes on the insurer the duty to defend, in good faith, any
person insured under the policy against any claim or suit
seeking damages which would be payable under the policy.
(6) (a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage provides an insurer with the defense of lack of
cooperation on the part of the insured, that defense is not
effective against a third person making a claim against
the insurer, unless there was collusion between the third
person and the insured.
(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective
against the claimant, after payment, the insurer is subrogated to the injured person's claim against the insured
to the extent of the payment and is entitled to reimbursement by the insured after the injured third person has
been made whole with respect to the claim against the
insured.
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302U) may specifically exclude from coverage
a person who is a resident of the named insured's household,
including a person who usually makes his home in the same
household but temporarily lives elsewhere, if each person
excluded from coverage satisfies the owner's or operator's
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, independently of
the named insured's proof of owner's or operator's security.
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VIKING INSURANCE COMPANY

: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS

OF WISCONSIN,

: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

ALLEN COLEMAN, RENE B. PETERSON,
:
TRANS COASTAL TRUCKING, and
:
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, :
:
Civil No- 940908046CV
Defendants.
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
The motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment and the
cross-motion of the defendants for summary judgment having come
before this Court for hearing on August 1, 1995, with Terry M.
Plant

appearing

for and

on behalf

of the

plaintiff, Viking

Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for
and on behalf of the defendant, Trans Coastal Trucking, Taylor D.
Carr appearing for and on behalf of the defendant, Allen Coleman,
and Keith L. Barton appearing for and behalf of the defendant, Rene
B. Peterson, the Court having reviewed memoranda filed by all
parties, having further considered oral argument offered for and on
behalf of all parties, and having otherwise reviewed the law and/or
facts applicable to this case,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the motion for summary

judgment of Viking

Insurance Company of Wisconsin is granted and the cross-motion for
summary judgment of the defendants is denied;
2.

That in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment the Court specifically finds that the accident in question
did not reasonably arise out of the operation, uce or maintenance
of an insured motor vehicle under the Viking Insurance Company
policy and, as a result thereof, the Court finds that Viking
Insurance Company owes no coverage whatsoever to its insured, Allen
Coleman, or any of the remaining defendants who are potential
claimants against Mr, Coleman, as a result of the accident in
question. In making this ruling, the Court specifically finds that
no coverage of any kind is due and owing any of the defendants
under the policy, nor can the defendants make any claim for
benefits under said policy as a result of the accident in question,
which occurred on or about January 7, 1994, at or near State Road
201 at its intersection with the 5600 West bridge overpass in West
Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

In addition, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court specifically finds that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final order and
hereby specifically makes an entry of final judgment as to the
Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin.
-2-

DATED this / ^

day of

ft£rV0*/^-

, 1995,

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Taylor D. Carr
Attorney for Defendant Coleman

Keith L. Barton
Attorney for Defendant Peterson

Robert G. Gilchrist
Attorney for Defendant
Trans Coastal Trucking

TMPtlrj/94-754.12
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UT0160 (4/93)

Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin

INSURED
NOTICE

, POLICY DECLARATIONS
POLICY MyttBER

TRANSACTION TYPE

44 0005256

NEW BUSINESS

Agent

TRANSACTION ££FECT!V£ &ATE

Date Printed
11/29/93

11/15/93

Agent Code
4400159
ALLGRUNN-SWIM AGY INC
3540 S 4000 W #430
WEST VALLEY C I T , UT 8 4 1 2 0 - 0 0 0 0

PQUCV £FF£CfIVE &A?£
Policy Effective at Time of Application,
Time Agent Bound Coverage, or
11/15/93
12:01 a.m. Standard Time,
whichever is later.

Agent Phone # 8 0 1 - 9 6 8 - 3 5 4 1

EXPIRATION OATS ^rn^MW^
Insured

01/15/94

COLEMAN, ALLEN K
COLEMAN, CINDY
3295 SOUTH 7615 WEST
MAGNA, UT 84044

mm

12:01 a.m. Standard Time

PREMIUM FOR CURRENT TERM
$106.00
Original Policy Inception Date
11/15/93

BATHES INFORMATION
Year 1983
Vehicle ID Number 1G3AE69R7DW351 369
Make OLDS
Vehicle Type
STANDARD
Model OMEGA BROU Vehicle Use
PERSONAL
Rated on Driver # 1
COLEMAN, ALLEN KENT
Rated Driver Birth Date 1 2 / 1 2 / 6 1
Rated Driver Gender M
Rated Dr. Marital Status M

1 MAO Symbol
Garaging Zip
Territory
Rating Points

00
84044
01
006

Multi-Car Credit
Safe Driver Credit
Defensive Dr. Cr.
Quarterly Discount
Preferred Cust. Cr.
Homeowner Credit

N
N
N
N
N
N

HPM^
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY

$25,000 each person
$50,000 each accident*

22.00

UNINSURED MOTORIST
BODILY INJURY

$25,000 each person
$50,000 each accident*

3.00

UNINSURED MOTORIST
PROPERTY DAMAGE

REJECTED

UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
BODILY INJURY

510,000 EACH PERSON
>20,000 EACH ACCIDENT*

3.00

PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION

SEE CE-59 FOR COVERAGES

11.00

PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

$15,000 each accident

14.00

* Limit of Liability each accident or occurrence as indicated by the Insuring Agreement
TOTAL MONTHLY PREMIUM

$53.00

DRIVER INFORMATION
DRIVER* 1

COLEMAN, ALLEN KENT
Birth Date 1 2 / 1 2 / 6 1

Driver Class 3

DRIVER* 2

COLEMAN, CINDY C
Birth Date 0 7 / 0 4 / 7 1

D,i,., c » 7

Financial Resp. N

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A
TR)JE

fljtf flJRRECT COPY

KUILIVY KJIWtS
The following policy forms and endorsements apply to this policy:
CE-26 ( 1 0 / 8 1 )
CE-59 ( 0 4 / 9 3 )
CE-61 ( 0 4 / 9 3 )

UT-CP ( 0 1 / 7 9 )

UT-CPA ( 0 4 / 9 3 )

ANY RENEWAL OF THIS POLICY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE RENEWAL PROVISION UNDER
THE GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS.
This policy is effective on the date shown on the face of these declarations. These declarations form a part of
the policy and replace all previously issued declarations for this policy. If these declarations are
accompanied by a new policy, this policy replaces any which may have been issued previously with the
same policy number.

THIS IS NOT A BILL - KEEP FOR YOUR RECORDS

A!3 3WWYTITiTOI

fc

Viking Insurance Company
of Wisconsin
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DEFINITIONS
The terms that are defined below are in italics when they appear in the text of this policy.
A car is a 4-wheel motor vehicle licensed for use on public roads. It includes any motor home that isn't used
for business purposes and any utility trailer.
A car accident is an unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or property damage and
arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car or other motor vehicle.
Damages means the cost of compensating those who suffer bodily injury or property damage from a car
accident. It does not include amounts awarded as a punishment or deterrent.
A motor vehicle is a land motor vehicle designed for use on public roads. It includes cars and trailers. It also
includes any other land motor vehicle while used on public roads.
Occupying means in, on or getting in or out of.
A utility trailer is a trailer designed for use with a car. It includes a farm implement or farm wagon while towed
on public roads by a car. It doesn't include a trailer used as an office, store, display or passenger trailer.
You, your, yourself means the person named on the declarations page and that person's husband or wife if
a resident of the same household.
You, your, yourself also means a member of the family who is a resident of the household and who doesn't
own a car or whose spouse doesn't own a car.

UT-CP (1/79)

-1-

UT1200 (4/93)

INSURING AGREEMENT
Upon your payment of the premiums, we agree that this policy provides the various kinds of insurance you
have selected as shown on the declarations page. The declarations page is a part of this policy. This insurance
applies only to car accidents and losses which occur while this policy is in force. Subject to our consent, you
may renew this policy. When we consent to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium in advance.
You will not be protected if you do not pay the renewal premium before your policy expires.

CARS WE INSURE
We insure any car described on the declarations page and any car you replace it with. We'll also insure any
additional car you acquire if we insure, under this insurance, all cars you own. But the replacement or addition
is insured only if you notify us within 30 days of its date of purchase.
We insure any utility trailer you own or are using except for collision and comprehensive insurance. For
collision and comprehensive insurance, the utility trailer must be listed on the declarations page and a premium
shown for it. We insure a substitute car when any car described on the declarations page, or any replacement
or addition, can't be used because it's being serviced or repaired, or it's been stolen or destroyed. A car owned
by you or a resident member of your family doesn't qualify as a substitute car.
We insure other cars you use with the permission of the owner, but not for collision or comprehensive
insurance. We don't insure other cars owned by, or furnished for the regular use of, you or resident members of
your family.

WHAT TO DO WHEN AN ACCIDENT HAPPENS
When you're involved in a car accident, you or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible.
The quickest way is to phone our nearest office. When you notify us, tell us how the accident happened and the
extent of any injuries. If we need other information to investigate the accident, we'll ask you for it. We will require
it in writing.
If you're injured, we may ask that you be examined by a doctor we select. You must be examined when and
as often as we may reasonably require. We may need authorization to obtain medical records and copies of
other records. You must give us authorization upon each request.
If the accident involves a hit-and-run driver, it must be reported within 24 hours to the police or Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. A statement under oath must be filed with us within 30 days after the accident has been
reported. If you were occupying a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, you must make it available for our
inspection, before it is repaired.
If you have comprehensive or collision insurance, you must protect the car from any further damage. If you fail
to do so, any further damage won't be recoverable under this policy. We'll pay any reasonable expenses
incurred in protecting the car. We may require that you file with us a sworn proof of loss within 60 days after the
accident. You may be required to show us your car or damaged property and submit to examination under oath.
You must cooperate with us in our effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims against you and
defend you. You must also send us, promptly, any legal papers served on you or your representative as a result
of a car accident. Wyou fail to cooperate or fail to promptly send us such legal papers, we may have the right to
refuse you any further protection for the accident or loss. If your car is stolen, you must report the theft to the
police within 24 hours.

LIABILITY INSURANCE
Our Promises To You
We promise to pay damages, within the limits of our policy, for bodily injury or property damage for which the
law holds you responsible because of a car accident involving a car we insure. We also promise to pay
additional benefits.
Additional Benefits
These benefits are in addition to our limit of liability for damages. We'll pay for the cost of investigating the car
accident and arranging for the settlement of any claim against you. We'll also defend you, hire and pay a lawyer,
and pay all defense costs if you're sued by someone for damages because of a car acc/denf-even if the
accusations aren't true. However, we won't be obligated to pay for the cost of any further investigation or
arrangement for settlement or to defend you further after we've paid our entire limit of liability for damages. If the
person who sues you tries to tie up your property by an attachment, we'll arrange and pay for a bond to release
the attachment. We do have to limit this, so you'll have to pay the cost of the additional amount of the bond if
the bond required is more than the limits of liability available to you.
Wyou lose a lawsuit that we're defending, we'll pay the court costs. If we decide to appeal, we'll also pay those
court costs. We'll also pay interest on the full amount of the judgement even if the judgement is higher than the
limit of liability. And we'll pay this interest from the day the judgement is entered until we've offered the other
party the amount of the judgement up to the full limits of liability available under this insurance.
We'll pay any reasonable travel expenses you might have for attending hearings or a trial at our request. We'll
pay your expense for first aid to others at the scene of a car accident involving a car we insure.
-2-

Protection For Others
Anyone using, with your permission, a car described on the declarations page, or any additional, replacement
or substitute car, has the same rights and obligations that you have under this insurance.
Any corporation you work for or any partnership in which you're a partner has the same rights and obligations
that you have under this insurance if it owns or hires a car described on the declarations page.
Anyone else who doesn't own or hire a car operated by you and who may be responsible for its use has the
same rights and obligations that you have under this insurance.
Those Not Protected
Anyone protected at the time of the car accident by an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance contract
isn't protected by this insurance. The reason for this is that by law such policies protect all persons involved in
the car accident-regardless of who was at fault.
Neither the United States of America nor any of its agencies is protected by this insurance.
Anyone for whom the United States Government may be held responsible under the Federal Tort Claim Act
isn't protected by this insurance.
Excluded Uses Of Cars
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure.
We don't insure your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge.
We don't insure any car you're driving while it's available for hire by the public.
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or
stunting contest or activity, or for the event itself.
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles.
However, we'll insure your use of a car in such business if you own the car and that car is insured under this
policy. Also, if you're the owner or a partner in such business, we'll insure your partner's and employee's use of
a car you own provided that car is insured under this policy.
Bodily Injury Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers bodily injury, including loss of services, sickness, disease or death which results from
the injury, caused by a car accident and suffered by any person.
This insurance doesn't cover your employees if you are required to provide workers' compensation insurance
and such insurance would apply to the injury.
This insurance doesn't cover a fellow employee of anyone protected by this insurance, other than you, if the
injury is suffered in the course of employment.
Property Damage Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers property damage that results from a car accident. Property damage means any injury
to or destruction of physical property, including the loss of use of that property.
This insurance doesn't cover any property damage to any property you rent, own, have charge of or are
transporting.
Limits Of Liability
The limits of liability shown on the declarations page are the maximum amounts we'll pay in damages for any
one car accident.
The limit for "each person" is the limit for all claims by all persons for damages from bodily injury to one person.
The limit for "each occurrence" is the total limit for all claims for damages from bodily injury to two or more
people in any one car accident. The limit for property damage is the limit for all claims for damages, direct or
indirect, by all persons from damage to property in any one car accident. Even though more than one car is
insured with us and separate premiums are charged for each car, or more than one person is protected under
this insurance, the limits of liability won't be increased. When damages are payable on your behalf under more
than one policy we've issued to you, we won't pay more than the highest limits in any one such policy.
Financial Responsibility Laws
If you're required to show proof of financial responsibility for the future because of car accidents, traffic
violations or other state motor vehicle requirements, we'll certify this policy as proof. When we certify this policy
as proof, all the terms and conditions of this insurance will be amended to comply with the requirements of such
law. But the terms and conditions of this insurance won't be amended for any limits of liability in excess of the
minimum limits required by such law. YOU MUST REIMBURSE US IF WE HAVE TO MAKE A PAYMENT THAT
WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO MAKE IF THIS POLICY WERE NOT CERTIFIED AS PROOF.

MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE
Our Promises To You
We promise to pay medical expenses for your bodily injury, sickness, disease or death suffered in a car
accident while occupying a car or from having been struck by a motor vehicle. We'll pay the medical expenses
incurred within one year from the date of the car accident, within the limits shown in the declarations.
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Protection For Others
Anyone occupying, with your permission, a car we insure has the same rights and obligations that you have
under this insurance.
Those Not Protected
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge isn't protected by this insurance.
Anyone occupying a car you're driving while it's available for hire by the public isn't protected by this
insurance.
Anyone occupying a car in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or stunting
contest or activity, or for the event itself, isn't protected by this insurance.
Anyone occupying or struck by a car owned by you or furnished for your regular use and not insured under
this insurance isn't protected by this insurance.
Anyone occupying a car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles
isn't protected by this insurance. However, we'll protect you, your partner or employee if the car is owned by you
and is insured under this insurance. We'll also protect occupants if the car owned by you and insured under this
insurance is being used by you, your partner or employee.
Anyone protected at the time of the car accident by an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance contract
isn't protected by this insurance. The reason for this is that by law such policies protect all persons involved in
the car accident-regardless of who was at fault.
Medical Expenses Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers reasonable and necessary medical, surgical, chiropractic and dental treatment, professional nursing, hospital, x-ray, ambulance and funeral services and prosthetic devices. This insurance also
covers reasonable and necessary treatment rendered in accordance with a legally recognized religious method
of healing.
This insurance doesn't cover that amount paid or payable under any health or accident insurance available.
This insurance doesn't cover that amount payable or required to be provided under any workers' compensation, disability benefits law or similar law.
This insurance doesn't cover medical expenses for injury caused by war.
THIS INSURANCE DOESN'T COVER CARE WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR ITS MILITARY
SERVICES ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE TO EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS, OR DEPENDENTS.
Payment Of Benefits
We may pay you, the person providing the medical services or the person responsible for payment of the
medical expenses.
When we pay your medical expenses, you or your legal representative must agree in writing to repay us out of
any damages you recover under the liability or uninsured motorist insurance of this policy.
Limits Of Medical Expense Insurance
Regardless of the number of cars we insure under this policy, the limit of medical expense insurance is the
amount shown on the declarations page for "each person". When medical expenses are payable under more
than one policy issued by us, we won't pay more than the highest limit in any one such policy.

UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
Our Promise To You
We promise to pay the damages you're legally entitled to receive from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury. We'll pay these damages for bodily injury you suffer in a car accident
while occupying a car or, as a pedestrian, as a result of having been struck by an uninsured motor vehicle.
Protection For Others
Anyone occupying, with your permission, a car we insure has the same rights and obligations that you have
under this insurance.
Those Not Protected
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge isn't protected by this insurance.
Anyone occupying a car you are driving while it's available for hire by the public isn't protected by this
insurance.
Anyone occupying a motor vehicle owned by you or furnished for your regular use and not insured under this
insurance isn't protected by this insurance.
Uninsured Motor Vehicles
An uninsured motor vehicle is a motor vehicle for which there is no bodily injury policy or liability bond
available at the time of the car accident with at least the minimum limits required by the financial responsibility
law of the state in which your car is principally garaged.
An uninsured motor vehicle also includes a motor vehicle which has insurance available at the time of the car
accident but the company writing it is or becomes insolvent or denies coverage.
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An uninsured motor vehicle u . hit-and-run motor vehicle that strikes yc
neither the driver nor the owner can be identified.

or a car you are occupying, if

Excluded Uninsured Motor Vehicles
A motor vehicle owned by you or furnished for your regular use isn't an uninsured motor vehicle.
A motor vehicle that's owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial
responsibility law, motor carrier law or any similar law isn't an uninsured motor vehicle.
A motor vehicle owned by any governmental authority or agency isn't an uninsured motor vehicle.
Bodily Injury Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers bodily injury, including loss of services, sickness, disease or death which results from
the injury, caused by a car accident and suffered by you. This insurance doesn't cover bodily injury if, without
our written consent, you settle or sue to a judgement a claim against anyone responsible for your injury.
Payment Of Damages
We may pay you, your legal representative or anyone authorized by law to receive payment.
The amount of damages payable under this insurance will be reduced by the amount paid by or on behalf of
anyone responsible for your injury. This includes any amount paid under the liability insurance of this policy and
any amount paid or payable under any workers' compensation law, disability benefits law or any similar
law-exclusive of any state non-occupational disability benefits law.
Trust Agreement
When we pay you damages under this insurance, you or your legal representative must agree in writing to
repay us out of any damages recovered from anyone responsible for your injuries. You or your legal representative must also agree in writing to hold in trust and preserve for us all rights of recovery.
At our request, you must take any necessary action to recover the payments we've made under this insurance.
You must do so in your own name and through a representative we select. Expenses of recovery will be repaid
to us out of any damages recovered.
Arbitration
If we and you, or your legal representative, don't agree on your legal right to receive damages or the amount
of damages, then upon the written request of either party, the disagreement will be settled by arbitration.
Arbitration will take place in the county where you live. You'll select one arbitrator and we'll select another. The
two selected arbitrators will then select a third. If the two arbitrators are unable to agree on a third arbitrator
within 30 days, the judge of the court of record in the county of jurisdiction where arbitration is pending will
appoint the third arbitrator.
Local court rules governing procedure and evidence will apply unless the arbitrators agree on other rules. The
decision in writing of any two arbitrators will be binding on you and us, subject to the terms of this insurance.
Judgement on any award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.
You'll pay the arbitrator that you choose and we'll pay the arbitrator we choose. The expense of the third
arbitrator and all other expense of arbitration will be shared equally by you and us.
Limits Of Uninsured Motorist Insurance
The limit of uninsured motorist insurance shown on the declarations page for "each person" is the maximum
we'll pay in damages for bodily injury to any one person.
The maximum we'll pay in damages for bodily injury to two or more persons is the amount shown on the
declarations page for "each accident".
Even though we insure you under more than one policy, or more than one car is listed on the declarations
page, and separate premiums are charged for each car or policy, these limits won't be increased.

COLLISION INSURANCE
Our Promise To You
We promise to pay you for accidental damage to your car and its equipment when it's hit by or it hits another
car, it hits another object or rolls over. We'll pay for the damage minus any applicable deductible. We'll waive
the deductible if the collision is between a car insured under this insurance and another car insured by us.
Excluded Uses Of Cars
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure.
We don't insure any car while it's available for hire by the public.
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or
stunting contest or activity, or used in the event itself.
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles.
However, we'll insure a car used in such business if the car is described on the declarations page, or is a
replacement, additional or substitute car.
Losses Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers all direct and accidental collision losses to cars we insure.
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This insurance doesn't cover c jllision loss of more than one stereo tape, .ssette or cartridge.
This insurance doesn't cover any loss due to war.
This insurance doesn't cover any camper unit that's designed for mounting on a vehicle unless the unit has
been reported to us.
This insurance doesn't cover any equipment or accessories contained in motor homes, camper units or trailers
unless they're built in and form a permanent part of the vehicle. In both cases a premium must be paid for this
coverage.
This insurance doesn't cover special equipment, parts and accessories unless you include them in the
application, or tell us when you add them to the car, and pay a premium for them. The following are examples
of special equipment, parts and accessories: (a) chrome, alloy, or magnesium wheels, (b) custom wide tread
tires and racing slicks, (c) custom paint work, glass, or chroming, (d) tape record player and stereo radios,
unless factory installed as original equipment, (e) two-way radios (including CB radios), and telephones or
radio-telephones, (f) custom enclosures for pickup trucks, (g) custom interior work.
This insurance doesn't cover any car you do not own unless it is listed in the declarations page.
Payment Of Loss
We may pay for the collision loss in cash or we may repair or replace the damaged property. We may take all
or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value.
We may settle any loss either with you or the owner of the property.
Limits Of Payment
The maximum limit of collision insurance for losses is the actual cost to repair or replace the damaged
property. Payment won't exceed the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss.

COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE
Our Promise To You
We promise to pay for direct and accidental loss of, or damage to, your car and its equipment-not caused by
collision. We'll pay for the loss or damage minus any applicable deductible.
Accidental glass breakage and loss or damage from missiles, falling objects, theft or animals is a comprehensive loss.
We also promise to pay additional benefits.
Additional Benefits
We'll pay you for transportation costs up to $10 per day to maximum of $300 if your car is stolen. We'll pay the
costs that begin 72 hours after the theft has been reported to us and to the police. The payment ends when your
car is recovered or we've paid or offered to pay the loss.
We'll pay salvage charges for which you become legally liable because of transporting a car we insure.
Excluded Uses Of Cars
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure.
We don't insure any car while it's available for hire by the public.
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or
stunting contest or activity, or used in the event itself.
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles.
However, we'll insure a car used in such business if the car is described on the declarations page, or is a
replacement, additional or substitute car.
Losses Covered By This Insurance
This insurance covers all direct and accidental comprehensive losses to cars we insure.
This insurance doesn't cover loss which is due and confined to wear and tear or mechanical or electrical
breakdown or failure, unless it results from a theft or other loss covered by this insurance.
This insurance doesn't cover a loss due to conversion or embezzlement.
This insurance doesn't cover a comprehensive loss of more than one stereo tape, cassette or cartridge.
This insurance doesn't cover any loss due to war.
This insurance doesn't cover any camper unit that's designed for mounting on a vehicle unless the unit has
been reported to us.
This insurance doesn't cover any equipment or accessories contained in motor homes, camper units or trailers
unless they're built in and form a permanent part of the vehicle. In both cases a premium must be paid for this
coverage.
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This insurance doesn't cover .jecial equipment, parts and accessories ,nless you include them in the
application, or tell us when you add them to the car, and pay a premium for them. The following are examples
of special equipment, parts and accessories: (a) chrome, alloy, or magnesium wheels, (b) custom wide tread
tires and racing slicks, (c) custom paint work, glass, or chroming, (d) tape record player and stereo radios,
unless factory installed as original equipment, (e) two-way radios (including CB radios), and telephones or
radio-telephones, (f) campers and custom enclosures for pickup trucks, (g) custom interior work.
This insurance doesn't cover any cars you do not own unless it is a substitute car, or it is listed on the
declarations page.
Payment Of Loss
We may pay for the loss in cash or we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen property. Before a loss is
paid or the property is replaced, we may return any stolen property to you at our expense with payment for any
damage.
We may settle any loss either with you or the owner of the property.
Limits Of Payment
The maximum limit of comprehensive insurance for losses is the actual cost to repair or replace the damaged
property. Payment won't exceed the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss.

GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS
Our Right To Recover From Others
After we have made payment under the Liability, Medical Expense, Uninsured Motorist, Comprehensive or
Collision insurance of this policy, we have the right to recover the payment from anyone who may be held
responsible. You and anyone we protect must sign any papers and do whatever else is necessary to transfer this
right to us. You and anyone we protect must do nothing to affect our rights.
Transfer Of This Policy
This policy can't be transferred to any person or organization without our written consent. However, if the
person named on the declarations page dies, this policy will provide protection until the end of the policy period
for the deceased's legal representative and those persons who were protected on the date of death.
Changes In Your Policy
We'll automatically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of this policy if the change doesn't
require additional premium.
The only other way this policy can be changed is by policy endorsement. Any necessary adjustment of
premium will be made at that time.
If, at the time of your application for insurance or the issuance of this policy, our agent misrepresents facts to
us without your knowledge, we won't void this policy or deny you protection in the event of a loss or claim.
Territory
This policy applies only to car accidents and losses within the United States of America, its territories or
possessions and Canada, or while the car is being transported between their ports.
Cancellation During The Policy Period
You may cancel this policy by mailing to us a written notice stating the future date you wish the cancellation to
be effective. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent as soon as possible after the date of
cancellation. The earned premium may be based on our short rate table. This means that we may keep premium
for the days you were protected, plus a percentage charge to cover the expense of cancelling during the policy
period.
We won't cancel this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, creed,
national origin, ancestry or occupation. If we cancel this policy, we must mail the notice of cancellation to you
at least 10 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent
as soon as possible after the cancellation date. The earned premium will be based on our pro rata table. This
means that we'll keep premium for only those days that you were protected.
If your state has special restrictions on our right to cancel, we will change our policy to meet these restrictions.
In that case, you will find the rules on cancellation in an endorsement which will be included with your policy.
If we cancel, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of
notice as of the date we mail it. Delivery of written notice of cancellation by either you or us will be equivalent to
mailing.
Renewal Provision
We won't refuse to renew this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color,
creed, national origin, ancestry or occupation. Subject to our consent, you may renew this policy. When we
consent to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium in advance. We will mail you a notice telling
you when your premium must be paid. Your policy will expire if we don't receive the required payment by the
renewal date.
If we decide not to renew your policy, we'll mail to you, at your address shown on the declarations page, written
notice of non-renewal. The written notice will be mailed to you at least 20 days before the end of the policy term.
If we decide not to renew your policy, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will
constitute proof of notice as of the date we mail it.
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Out-Of-State Insurance
If this policy provides liability insurance and you are traveling in a state which requires non-residents to carry
higher liability limits than are shown on the declaration page of your policy we'll automatically provide these
higher limits. However, we won't provide any additional coverage under the No-Fault law or any other similar
law of any other state. This insurance is excess only.
Other Insurance
Sometimes two or more insurance policies protect the same person or organization for a car accident. When
this happens, damages or loss may be payable under each policy. Insurance companies try to avoid conflicts
where this possibility exists by stating the basis on which their insurance applies. Where it isn't likely any other
insurance will be involved, the insurance company usually makes its insurance primary. Primary insurance pays
even if there is other insurance. Where it's likely that other insurance will apply, insurance companies make their
insurance excess. Excess insurance protects you when primary insurance is exhausted or no primary insurance
is available.
This insurance is primary for any car described on the declaration page, or any additional or replacement car
we insure.
This insurance is excess for the use of any car not owned by you.
Occasionally there is other primary insurance available when this insurance is primary; or there is other excess
insurance available when this insurance is excess. When this happens the following rules apply:
LIABILITY INSURANCE--lf the other insurance isn't issued by us, we'll pay only our share of any damages. Our
share is determined by adding up the limits of this insurance and all other insurance that applies on trie same
basis and finding the percentage of the total which our limits represent.
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE-We'll pay only our share of any damages. Our share is determined by
adding up the limits of this insurance and any other insurance that applies on the same basis and finding the
percentage of the total which our limits represent. That percentage is applied to the amount of damages which
doesn't exceed the highest limit of any one such policy.
When this insurance is excess and all other insurance is primary, we'll pay damages up to the amount by
which this insurance exceeds the limits of the primary insurance.
COLLISION AND COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE-The amount of the loss in excess of any applicable
deductible will be shared equally.
Collision And Comprehensive Payments
We will pay loss or damage due under this policy according to your interest and that of the lienholder. We may
make separate payments according to those interests.
We will pay the lienholder for a loss under the terms of this policy even though you have violated the terms of
the policy by something you have done or failed to do. However, we will not pay for any loss caused by
conversion, embezzlement or secretion by you or anyone acting on your behalf. We will not pay the lienholder
more than the net balance of the loan.
We will not notify the lienholder each time you renew this policy and we may cancel this policy according to its
terms. We will protect the lienholder's interest for 10 days after we notify him that the policy has terminated, for
any reason.
If you fail to give proof of loss within the time allowed, the lienholder may protect his interest by filing a proof
of loss within 30 days after that time.
The lienholder must notify us of any known change of ownership or increase in the risk. If he does not, he will
not be entitled to any payment under this endorsement.
If we pay the lienholder under the terms of this endorsement for a loss not covered under the policy, we are
subrogated to his rights against you. This will not affect the lienholder's right to recover the full amount of his
claim. The lienholder must assign us his interest up to the amount of our payment and transfer to us all
supporting documents.
This policy is signed at Madison, Wisconsin, on behalf of Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin by our
President and Secretary. It's countersigned on the declarations page by our authorized representative.

Secretary

0
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President

AME

DATORY ENDORSEMENT - (
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This endorsement modifies the "DEFINITIONS", "WHAT TO DO WHEN AN ACCIDENT HAPPENS", "UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE", and "GENERAL PROVISIONS" sections of your policy.
DEFINITIONS
The definition of motor vehicle is replaced by the following:
Motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers
and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farm tractors, tractor
cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from
overhead wires but not operated upon rails.
The definition of you, your and yourself is replaced by the following:
You, your, yourself means the person named on the declarations page and that person's husband or wife if
a resident of the same household.
You, your, yourself also means a member of the family who is a resident of the household and does not own
a car or whose spouse does not own a car, or a member of the family who temporarily lives elsewhere and does
not own a car. A "member of the family" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption and
includes a ward or foster child.
W H A T YOU M U S I HO W H E N \\ II II U X I D E N T HAPPENS
This section is replaced with the following:
When you're involved in a car accident, you or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible.
The quickest way is to phone our nearest office. Notice to our authorized representative is considered notice to
us. When you notify us, tell us how the accident happened and the extent of any injuries. If we need other
information to investigate the accident we'll ask you for it. We will require it in writing.
If you're injured, we may ask that you be examined by a doctor we select. You must be examined when and
as often as we may reasonably require. We may need authorization to obtain medical records and copies of
other records. You must give us authorization upon each request.
If the accident involves a hit-and-run driver, it must be reported within 24 hours to the police or Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. A statement under oath must be filed with us within 30 days after the accident has been
reported. If you were occupying a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, you must make it available for our
inspection, before it is repaired.
If you have comprehensive or collision insurance, you must protect the car from any further damage. If you
fail to do so, any further damage won't be recoverable under this policy. We'll pay any reasonable expenses
incurred in protecting the car. We may require that you file with us a sworn proof of loss within 60 days after the
accident. You may be required to show us your car or damaged property and submit to examination under
oath.
You must cooperate with us in our effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims against you and
defend you. You must also send us, promptly, any legal papers served on you or your representative as a result
of a car accident. If you fail to cooperate or fail to promptly send us such legal papers, we may have the right
to refuse you any further protection for the accident or loss. If your car is stolen, you must report the theft to the
police within 24 hours.
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
The "Those Not Protected" is replaced by the following:
Those Not Protected
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired, rented or leased to others isn't protected by this insurance.
Anyone occupying any car you are driving while hired, rented or leased by you which is not listed on the
declarations page or is not a substitute car isn't protected by this insurance.
The "Uninsured Motor Vehicles" section is replaced by the following:
Uninsured Motor Vehicle
An uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is not insured by a bodily injury liability policy or
bond at the time of the car accident. This also includes a motor vehicle which is insured at the time of the car
accident by a bodily injury liability policy or bond with limits below the minimum required by the financial
responsibility law of the state in which your car is principally garaged.
An uninsured motor vehicle also includes a motor vehicle which has insurance available at the time of the car
accident but the company writing it is or becomes insolvent or denies coverage.
An uninsured motor vehicle is a hit-and-run motor vehicle that strikes you, or a car you are occupying, if
neither the driver nor the owner can be identified.
If there is no physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the accident must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence from more than the covered person's testimony.

NOTICE
You may reject Uninsured Motorist Insurance by providing a written request. Such a rejection request is
continuous until you request, in writing, Uninsured Motorist Insurance.

GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS
The "Cancellation During the Policy Period" section is replaced by the following:
Cancellation During The Policy Period
You may cancel this policy by mailing to us a written notice stating the future date you wish the cancellation to
be effective. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent as soon as possible after the date of
cancellation. The earned premium will be based on our short rate table. This means that we'll keep premium
for days you were protected, plus a percentage charge to cover the expense of cancelling during the policy
period.
We won't cancel this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, creed,
national origin, ancestry or occupation.
If we cancel this policy within the first 60 days of coverage, or because you don't pay the premium when it's
due, we must mail the notice of cancellation to you at least 10 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If we
cancel this policy for any other reason after the first 60 days of coverage, we must mail the notice of cancellation
to you at least 30 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to you
as soon as possible after the cancellation date. The earned premium will be based on our pro rata table. This
means that we'll keep premium for only those days that you were protected.
After all or any part of this policy has been in effect for more than 60 days, or if this policy is a renewal, effective
immediately, our right to cancel is limited. We may then cancel this policy only if you don't pay the premium
when it is due, or if you obtained this policy through material misrepresentation, or a substantial change in risk,
or substantial breach of contractual duties, conditions or warranties, or if your driver's license is suspended or
revoked during the policy period.
If we cancel, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of
notice as of the date we mail it. Delivery of written notice of cancellation by either you or us will be equivalent to
mailing.
The "Renewal Provision" section is replaced by the following:
Renewal Provision
We won't refuse to renew this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, ancestry or occupation. If we decide not to renew your policy, we will mail you
written notice 30 days before the end of the policy period. If we decide not to renew your policy, our mailing of
notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of notice as of the date we mail it.
When we offer to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium before the renewal date. We will mail
you a notice telling you when your premium must be paid. Your policy will expire if we don't receive the required
payment by the renewal date.
The "Out-of-State Insurance" section is replaced by the following:
If this policy provides liability insurance and you are traveling in a state which has compulsory motor vehicle
insurance requirements for non-residents, we will automatically provide the required liability insurance. However, this insurance will be excess only.
UT-CPA (9/93)

The Medical Expense Section is

'aced with the following:

PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE - UTAH
We agree with you, subject to all of the provisions in this endorsement and to all of the provisions of the policy
except as modified herein, as follows:

SECTION I
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for:
(a) medical expenses,
(b) work loss,
(c) funeral expenses, and
(d) survivor loss
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an accident involving the use of
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Exclusions
This coverage does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle which is owned by you
or a family member and which is not your covered auto:
(b) to bodily injury sustained by any person while operating your covered auto without your express
or implied consent or while not in lawful possession of your covered auto.
(c) to bodily injury sustained by any person, if such person's conduct contributed to his injury under
either of the following circumstances:
(1) causing injury to himself intentionally, or
(2) while committing a felony;
(d) to bodily injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while located
for use as a residence or premises;
(e) to bodily injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution,
or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing;
(f) to bodily injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of
nuclear material.
Definitions
When used in reference to this coverage:
Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom;
Eligible injured person means:
(a) you or any family member who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use of
any motor vehicle;
(b) any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident while:
(1) occupying your covered auto with your consent, or
(2) occupying any other motor vehicle other than a public or livery conveyance, operated by you or
a family member
(3) a pedestrian if the accident involves the use of your covered auto\
Funeral expenses means funeral, burial or cremation expenses incurred;
Insured means you, your spouse or a family member who resides in the same household as you including
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using
the described motor vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner;
Your covered auto means a motor vehicle with respect to which
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific premium is
charged, and
(b) the named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions of Title 41, Chapter 12a
Utah Code Ann.
Medical expenses means the reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental
and rehabilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital and nursing services,
and any non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method
of healing; however, it does not include expenses in excess of those for a semi-private room, unless more
intensive care is medically required;

Motor vehicle means every se'
opelled vehicle which is designed for use
:>n a highway, including trailers
and semitrailers designed for use w/ith such vehicles, except traction engines,, ^ad rollers, farm tractors, tractor
cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from
overhead wires but not operated upon rails;
Named insured or you means the person or organization in the declarations;
Occupying means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate
act of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle;
Pedestrian means any person not occupying or riding upon a motor vehicle;
Relative means a spouse or any other person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption (including a ward
or foster child) who is a resident of the same household as the named insured, or who usually makes his home
in the same household but temporarily lives elsewhere;
Survivor loss means compensation on account of the death of the eligible injured person;
Work loss means (a) loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the eligible injured person during his
lifetime, from inability to work during a period commencing three days after the date of the bodily injury and
continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, provided that if such eligible injured person's
inability to work shall so continue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of the bodily
injury, this three day elimination period shall not be applicable; and (b) an allowance for services actually
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred that, but for the bodily injury, the eligible injured person would have
performed during his lifetime for his household commencing three days after the date of the bodily injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365 consecutive days thereafter, provided that if such eligible injured person's
inability to perform such services shall continue for in excess of two consecutive weeks after the date of the
bodily injury, this three day elimination period shall not be applicable.
Policy Period; Territory
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period and within the United States of
America, its territories or possessions, or Canada.
Limits of Liability
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds applicable, claim made, or covered autos to
which this coverage applies, our liability for personal injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor vehicle accident, is limited as follows:
1. the maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed $3,000;
2. the maximum amount payable for work loss is
(a) eighty-five percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, not to exceed the total of
$250 per week; For a maximum of 52 weeks after the loss.
(b) $20 per day for inability to perform services for his household; For a maximum of 365 days after
the loss.
3. the maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall not exceed $1,500;
4. the amount payable by us under the terms of this coverage shall be reduced by the amount paid, payable, or required to be provided on account of such bodily injury
(a) under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan;
(b) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his or her being on active duty in the
military services.
Conditions
A. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against us unless as a condition precedent thereto, there
shall have been full compliance with all the terms of this coverage.
B. Notice. In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the eligible injured person, and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of
the accident shall be given by or on behalf of each eligible injured person to us or any of our authorized
agents as soon as practicable. If any eligible injured person, his legal representative or his survivors shall
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily injury against a person or organization who is or may
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and complaint or other process served in connection with
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as practicable to us by such eligible person, his legal representative, or his survivor.
C. Medical Reports: Proof of Claim. As soon as practicable, the eligible injured person or someone on his
behalf shall give to us written proof of claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of the nature
and the extent of the injuries and treatment received and contemplated, and such other information as
may assist us in determining the amount due and payable. The eligible injured person shall submit to
physical and mental examinations by physicians selected by us when and as often as we may reasonably
require.
D. Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this coverage, we are subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such payments, and such
person must execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.

E. Reimbursement and Trust /
cement. In the event of any payment to
person under this coverage:
1. we shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made and we shall have
a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter;
2. such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of us all rights of recovery which he shall have against
such other person or organization because of such bodily injury,
3. such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such
rights;
4. such person shall execute and deliver to us instruments and papers as may be appropriate to secure
the rights and obligations of such person and us established by this provision.
F. Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance. The following provisions apply:
1. No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or
any other insurance.
2. This insurance is primary only for bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person in an accident
arising out of the use or operation of an insured motor vehicle.
3. If an eligible injured person is entitled to similar benefits under more than one policy, the maximum
amount recoverable under all policies combined shall not exceed the amount payable under the policy
with the highest dollar limit. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all
applicable limits on the same basis.

SECTION II
Personal Injury Protection benefits paid or payable under this or any other auto insurance policy because of
bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person shall be primary to any Medical Payments Coverage
provided under this policy.

SECTION III
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in reliance upon the limitations on
the right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of Title 31 A, Utah Code Ann. In the event a court of
competent jurisdiction declares, or enters a judgment the effect of which is to render the provisions of such act
invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, we shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at our option.
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UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
We will pay damages, except punitive damages, which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by
an accident. The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.
We will pay under this coverage only after limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or
policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
Determination of whether an insured is legally entitled to recover damages or the amount of the damages shall
be made by agreement between that person and us. If suit is brought to determine legal liability or amount of
damages without our written consent, we are not bound by any resulting judgment.
Insured as used in this Part means:
1. You or any family member, including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
2. Any other person occupying your car.
3. Any person who is entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of the underinsured motor
vehicle because of bodily injury to persons listed in (1) or (2).
Underinsured motor vehicle means a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to
compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages.
However underinsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle:
1. The operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered under a liability policy or bond.
2. Covered with lower liability limits than required by the Financial Responsibility Law of Utah Section 31A22-304.
3. That is unidentifiable that left the scene of the accident proximately caused by the vehicle operator.

4. That is insured by a liabil
policy but the insuring company is declar
'nsolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction.
5. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.
6. Owned by any governmental unit or agency.
7. Operated on rails or crawler treads.
8. Which is a farm type tractor or equipment designed mainly for use off public roads while not on public
roads.
9. While located as a residence or premises.
EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. If that person or the legal representative settles the bodily injury claim without our consent.
2. While occupying your car when it is being used to carry persons or property for a fee. This exclusion
does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool.
3. Using a vehicle without your permission or not within the scope of your permission.
4. While occupying, operating, or maintaining any vehicle not licensed for use on public roads.
5. While "occupying" or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any "family member" which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with this
vehicle.
6. While occupying, operating, or maintaining a motorcycle.
B. We will not pay for exemplary or punitive damages.
C. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any worker's
or workmen's compensation law.
L I M I T O F LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of covered cars, policies of insurance with our company or others, claims made or
vehicles involved in the accident, our limit of liability is as follows:
1. The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any
once accident is the limit shown in the Declarations for "each person."
2. Subject to the limit for "each person," the most we will pay for all damages resulting for bodily injury
caused by any one accident is the limit shown in the Declarations for "each accident."
3. The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an insured person for any one accident.
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be excess of:
1. all sums paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be
legally responsible. This includes all sums paid under the Liability Coverage of this policy, and
2. all sums paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any worker's or workmen's compensation,
disability benefits law.
Any payment under this coverage to or for a covered person will reduce any amount that person is entitled to
recover under the Liability Coverage of this policy.
OTHER INSURANCE
If you are injured while occupying your car, you may not elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which you are covered unless coverage is not
available under this policy.
If you are injured as a pedestrian or while occupying a vehicle other than your car, you may elect the policy
under which you collect underinsured motorist benefits.
TRUST AGREEMENT/SUBROGATION
If we pay you for loss under this coverage:
1. We are entitled to recover from you an amount equal to such payment if there is a legal settlement
made on your behalf against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury.
2. You must hold in trust for us all rights which you have to recover money from any person or organization legally responsible for bodily injury.
3. You must do everything proper to secure our rights and do nothing to prejudice these rights.
4. If we ask you in writing, you shall take the necessary or appropriate action, through a representative
designated by us, to recover payment as damages from the responsible person or organization. If
there is a recovery, then we shall be reimbursed out of the recovery for expenses, costs and attorney's
fees incurred in connection with this recovery.

5. You must execute and de'
to us any legal instruments or papers nc
obligations of you and us oo established here.

sary to secure the rights and

NOTICE
You may reject Underinsured Motorist Insurance by providing a written request. Such a rejection request is
continuous until you request, in writing, Underinsured Motorist Insurance.
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PROPERTY DAMAGE UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT - UTAH
In return for payment of premium for this coverage and subject to all the terms of the policy that apply, we agree
with you as follows:
We will pay compensatory damages which you are legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of property damage caused by an accident. The owner's or operator's liability
for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. Any
judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without our consent is not binding on us.
Your covered auto means a motor vehicle with respect to which
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific premium is
charged, and
(b) the named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions of Title 41, Chapter 12a
Utah Code Ann.
Property damage as used in this endorsement means injury to or destruction of your covered auto. However,
property damage does not include loss of use of your covered auto.
Uninsured motor vehicle as used in this endorsement means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type, that
hits your covered auto and whose owner, operator or license number can be identified.
A. To which no liability bond or policy affording coverage for property damage applies at the time of the accident; or
B. To which a liability bond or policy affording coverage for property damage applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or insuring company:
(a) denies coverage; or
(b) becomes insolvent; or
(c) becomes voluntarily or involuntarily bankrupt; or
(d) is placed in receivership.
However, uninsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle or equipment:
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law, except a self-insurer
which is or becomes insolvent.
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency.
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads.
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on public roads.
6. While located for use as a residence or premises.

EXCLUSIONS
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage for property damage.
1. To any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under
this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle.
2. If you or your legal representative settles the property damage claim without our consent.
3. When your covered auto is being used as a public or livery conveyance. This exclusion does not apply
to a share-the-expense car pool.
4. For the first $250 of the amount of property damage to each of your covered autos as the result of an
accident.
5. When your covered auto is being used by a person without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer of property.
C. We do not provide Property Damage Uninsured Motorists Coverage for punitive or exemplary damages.

L I M I T O F LIABILITY
The limit of liability for this coverage is $3,500.00. It is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting
from any one accident. Subject to this maximum, our limit of liability will be the lessor of:
1. The actual cash value of the damaged property; or
2. The amount necessary to repair or replace the property:
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. Claims made;
2. Vehicles we insure or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
3. Vehicles involved in the accident.
An adjustment for depreciation and physical condition will be made in determining actual cash value at the
time of loss.
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid because of
the property damage:
1. By or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible.
2. Under any similar coverage under any other policy.
OTHER INSURANCE
Any coverage provided by this Endorsement is excess to any other insurance covering property damage to
your covered auto.
ARBITRATION
This provision does not apply if a small claims court having jurisdiction resolves the matter or matters upon
which the parties do not agree.
A. If we and an insured do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement; or
2. As to the amount of damages;
then the matter may be arbitrated. However, both parties must agree to arbitration and to be bound by the
results of that arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third.
If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having
jurisdiction.
B. Each party will:
1. Pay the expenses it incurs, and
2. Bear the expense of the third arbitrator equally.
C. Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in either of the following, at the election of
the insured:
1. The county and state where the insured resides; or
2. The county and state where the insured's cause of action against the operator or owner of the uninsured motor vehicle arose.
Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will
be binding.
A D D I T I O N A L DUTIES AFTER A N A C C I D E N T OR LOSS
A person seeking Property Damage Uninsured Motorist Coverage, or someone on that person's behalf, must
also:
1. Report the accident within 10 days to us or our agent.
2. Promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit is brought.
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